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This paper analyzes whether China’s investment and savings rates are too high by
considering the rate of return to investment and other factors. It also investigates
the reasons for the rapid increase in the savings rate by using various sources of data
and analytical tools. In particular, much attention is paid to the distribution of
income among households, corporations, and the government, and to the labor
income share. Policy proposals for structural adjustment are discussed based on the
finding of the investigation.
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Background
Since the start of the new century, China’s economic demand structure has undergone
a very rapid change. Household consumption as a share of GDP declined from 46.4 %
in 2000 to 33.8 % in 2010; national savings rate increased from 37.7 to 52.6 % in the
same period. More detailed information about the demand structure of the economy is
provided in Fig. 1.
This rapid change in the economic structure invites several important questions. The
first is whether this structure is appropriate. The facts that China’s savings rate rises
very fast and that it is one of the very highest in the world do not necessarily mean it
is too high. One reason is that China is still a relatively poor country with per capita
capital stock much lower than that in advanced economies and therefore there is tre-
mendous room for additional investment. Another reason is that other countries may
be saving too little for the good of their economy. One needs to go beyond simple time
series or cross-sectional comparison to answer the question.
The second question is, if one comes to the conclusion that China does save too
much, what are the reasons behind the high savings rate? There are many possible
answers to this question. One often mentioned reason is that people engage in a lot of
precautionary savings in response to high level of risks that are not covered by insur-
ance. These risks include that in post retirement income and expenses, in medical
expenses, and in unemployment. Another often mentioned reason is that the costs of
housing and education are very high and there are constraints on people’s ability to
borrow to spread out the payment for the costs, and consequently people save to pay
for these costs. A third reason is that with rapid increase in income, people’s
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consumption habit falls behind income rise, resulting in higher savings. Finally, income
inequality is believed to be another reason behind the high savings rate. Some argue
that richer people have higher savings rates. Others argue that with more skewed in-
come distribution, lower income people save more in order to catch up with the more
affluent neighbors. All these arguments focus on the household sector as the driver of
the increased savings rate. This cannot be the whole story, or even the most important
story. In 2000, household disposable income was about 65 % of GDP, and household
savings rate was about 28 %. If the share of household disposable income in GDP had
not changed from 2000 to 2010, as household consumption declined from 46.4 % of
GDP in 2000 to 33.8 % in 2010, household savings rate would have to increase from 28
to 48 %, which is highly unlikely to have happened. Therefore, the decline in the share
of household disposable income in GDP is almost certainly an important factor behind
the increased savings rate. To understand the reasons for the increased savings rate, it
is necessary to understand why household income share has declined.
The third question is what policies can help reduce savings rate and increase house-
hold consumption rate. These policies have to target the underlying factors behind our
problem. Meanwhile, it is also necessary to consider other possible effects of these pol-
icies so that no new problems are created in the process of solving an old problem.
This paper attempts to answer these three questions in turn.
Is the savings rate too high?
Savings can be used for domestic investment and overseas investment. Overseas invest-
ment is the part of GDP that is not consumed or invested domestically and is therefore
equal to net export, or trade surplus. It is hard to imagine the share of trade surplus in
GDP can maintain sustained growth for a large and fast-growing economy such as
China. The reason is the Chinese economy grows faster than the world average, and
therefore, for the share of trade surplus in GDP to grow in China, the share of trade
Fig. 1 The demand structure of China’s economy
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deficit in GDP in the rest of the world taken as a whole will have to grow faster. For ex-
ample, suppose the Chinese economy grows by 8 % a year, but the average annual eco-
nomic growth rate in the rest of the world is 5 %, then the share of trade deficit in
GDP in the rest of the world taken as a whole will grow 3 percentage points faster than
the share of trade surplus in GDP in China. This cannot be sustainable. In fact, China’s
share of trade surplus in GDP dropped from 8.8 % in 2007 to below 4 % in 2010, and it
is still declining. Therefore, we cannot expect China’s share of overseas investment in
GDP to grow consistently. If that is the case, then high savings rate will have to mean
high domestic investment rate.
China’s investment rate increased from 35.3 % in year 2000 to 48.6 % in year 2010.
According to Penn World Table, only 12 countries in the world, Kiribati, Suriname,
Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Marshall Islands, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon,
Botswana, Bahrain, Grenada, and Bahamas, had higher investment rates than China in
2009. In the same year, the average investment rate among 40 largest economies
excluding China was 22.4 %, just half that of China.
These numbers tell us that China’s investment rate has increased very rapidly in the last
decade and its level is extraordinarily high among major economies. However, these num-
bers alone do not necessarily mean that China is investing too much as is explained in the
introduction. It is necessary to examine other factors to make the judgment.
One indicator to consider is the rate of return to investment. The 2006 paper by Bai,
Hsieh and Qian in Brookings Paper on Economic Activity estimates these rates by using
the GDP account data of China. The capital stock is estimated by the perpetual inven-
tory method. Capital accumulation is divided into two types, equipment on the one
hand and buildings and structures on the other. Different price indices and depreci-
ation rates are used for the two types of investment, with the depreciation rate derived
from the average life time and the average residual value at the end of the life time of
the investment. The share of capital income in GDP is computed from provincial cap-
ital shares since national capital share is only published with a lag of a few years. The
after tax and after depreciation rates of returns to capital are illustrated in Fig. 2.
The figure shows a declining trend of the rates of return to capital. In 2010, the last
year when the estimate is available, the rate of return was as low as 5.1 %. Note that
this is the average rate of return to capital of the whole country. For firms with some
monopoly power, the marginal rate of return to capital is lower than the average rate of
return because the latter includes the monopoly profit, and therefore the average
Fig. 2 After tax and after depreciation real rates of return to capital
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marginal rate of return to capital of the whole country is below 5.1 %. Furthermore, be-
cause the rate of return to capital varies across investment projects, there must be
many projects with marginal rate of return even lower than 5.1 %. These results about
the rates of return to capital suggest that one needs to be concerned about overinvest-
ment, especially if the declining trend continues.
It has been argued once and again that China does not need to worry about overin-
vestment because it is still a relatively poor country and per capita capital stock is still
much lower than that in advanced economies. This argument is flawed. Investment
should go hand in hand with total factor productivity. It will take a long time for China
to catch up with advanced economies in terms of total factor productivity, and there-
fore it should also take a long time for per capita capital stock in China to approach
the advance level. When the pace of investment is too much faster than that of the
improvement in total factor productivity, investment will generate a very low return, as
is evidenced by our estimate of the rate of return to capital.
It has also been argued that high investment rate is indispensable for economic
growth. However, the growth of output is not the ultimate objective; the growth in con-
sumption is more important than the growth in output. Raising investment rate can in-
crease output. However, if investment rate is too high, raising investment further will
reduce consumption. According to the Solow growth model, the golden rule level of
savings rate that maximizes consumption is equal to the capital income share. In China,
the average share of capital income in all factor income between 1992 and 2007 was
about 38.7 % if we use the data from the 2007 version of the flow of funds table, and
was about 43.7 % if we use the GDP account data by the income approach. Both of
these two numbers are much lower than the investment rate of 48.6 %. That is, China’s
investment rate is much higher than the golden rule level, suggesting that the invest-
ment rate is too high for maximizing consumption and so is the savings rate.
Why is the savings rate so high?
There is a lot of discussion about China’s high savings rate. Much of the discussion is
focused on household savings. The questions are how much household savings rate has
increased and whether the rise in household savings rate alone can explain the rise in
national savings rate.
According to the flow of funds table, household savings rate was 27.5 % in 2000 and
38.1 % in 2007. This is indeed a very rapid rise. From the same data source, the share
of household disposable income in GDP was 62.8 % in 2000. Suppose this share had
not changed, then the rise in household savings rate from 27.5 to 38.1 % would imply a
rise in national savings rate of 6.7 percentage points. However, in the same period,
national savings rate actually rose by 13.3 percentage points. That is, the increase in
household savings rate alone can only explain half of the rise in national savings rate.
Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that the flow of funds table overstates the
increase in household savings rate and the decline in household consumption rate. One
reason is that the flow of funds table understates the rise in government income. For
example, for the period of 2000 to 2007, the flow of funds table reports an increase in
the share of net production tax in GDP of 1.1 percentage points, but the Yearbook of
Fiscal Affairs reports an increase of 3.5 percentage points. The other reason is that it
understates the decline in the labor income share and therefore the increase in the
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share of corporate disposable income in GDP. According to the flow of funds table, the
labor income share dropped by only 2.7 percentage points between 2000 and 2007,
while GDP account data by the income approach imply a drop of 5.3 percentage points.
Both of these biases lead to an understatement of the decline in the share of household
disposable income in GDP and therefore an overstatement of the decline in household
consumption rate.
To better understand how the change in household savings affects the change in na-
tional savings rate, we make adjustments to the flow of funds table by using more reli-
able sources of data and compute household savings rate and the share of household
disposable income in GDP using the adjusted flow of funds table. We use data from
the Yearbook of Fiscal Affairs to adjust government income and the GDP account data
by the income approach to adjust the labor income share. Our first finding is that
household savings rate did not increase nearly as much as the original flow of funds
table indicates, as illustrated by Fig. 3. From 2000 to 2007, household savings rate in-
creased from 26 to 32.2 %. This alone is certainly not enough to explain the 13.3 per-
centage point rise in national savings rate in this period.
Our second finding is that the share of household disposable income in GDP experi-
enced a very sharp drop in this period, as illustrated by Fig. 4. From 2000 to 2007, the
share dropped from 61.6 to 50.9 %. Meanwhile, both the shares of government dispos-
able income and corporate disposable income in GDP rose, with the former rose by 7.6
percentage points. Furthermore, government savings rate increased from 11.4 to 47.1 %
in this period. As a result of these changes, the share of household savings in GDP in-
creased by only 0.5 percentage point, a very small portion of the 13.3 percentage points
rise in national savings rate in this period. However, the share of government savings in
GDP increased by 9.8 percentage points, and the share of corporate savings to GDP in-
creased by 3 percentage points, as illustrated by Fig. 5. In short, the increase in house-
hold savings is only a very small part of the increase in national savings rate; and the
increase in government savings is the most important part, followed by the increase in
corporate savings. These changes are driven by two phenomena, one is the rapid de-
cline in the share of household disposable income in GDP and the other is the dramatic
increase in government savings rate. The second driver follows from the first because
the rapid increase in government disposable income allows the government to invest
more of it rather than consuming it.
Fig. 3 The average savings rate
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One may argue, a la Ricardian equivalence, that the distribution of income among
households, corporations and the government should not affect national savings if gov-
ernment consumption does not change; when corporations and the government save
more, households, as owners of corporations and tax payers, will benefit from these
savings in the future and should save less now. This argument is particularly irrelevant
in the context of China. Big corporations, often state owned, and the government do
not invest efficiently, and as a result, households view the increase in corporate and
government disposable income as permanently lost household income rather than
household savings temporarily held by the corporations and the government. Distribu-
tion of income among households, corporations, and the government matters.
Household disposable income is affected by six factors: labor income, household cap-
ital income, household business operating surplus, income tax payment, net social se-
curity payment, and other transfers received by the household. From the adjusted flow
of funds table, we find that the changes of these factors are all in the direction of redu-
cing the share of household disposable income in GDP; that is, the shares in GDP of
labor income, household capital income, household business operating surplus, and
other transfers received by the household all declined, and the shares in GDP of indi-
vidual income tax payment and net social security payment both increased. The most
important factor is the decline of the labor income share.
Between 2000 and 2007, the labor income share declined from 48.7 to 43.5 %. The
most important source of this change is the structural transformation from agriculture
to industry and services. The labor share in agriculture is significantly higher than those
Fig. 4 The share of household disposable income in GDP
Fig. 5 The shares of household, corporate, and government savings in GDP
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in industry and services. As the weight of agriculture declines, the aggregate labor share
declines. The second most important source is the decline of labor share in industry.
Using firm level data from industry, we find that the decline of labor share in industry
can be mostly explained by the reform of the state-owned enterprises and the increase
of monopoly power, with the former playing a much bigger role than the latter. Labor
share tends to be higher in state-owned enterprises than in enterprises of other owner-
ship types. With the reform, the share of state-owned enterprises in the economy has
been declining, leading to the decline in aggregate labor share. Furthermore, within
state-owned enterprises, labor share has declined as these enterprises shed more and
more of their surplus labor in the process of the reform. As for the impact of monopoly
power on labor share, if firms with monopoly power are compared with other firms,
even though the former pay their employees more, their profits are even higher, and
therefore their labor shares are lower.
An often mentioned reason for the decline in the labor income share is that wages
rise very slowly due to the large pool of surplus labor in the rural area. This is not a
real reason. If wages rise more slowly than productivity, employment will rise quickly.
These two effects cancel each other and do not affect the labor income share if the
elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is one. Using the firm level data in
industry, we find that the elasticity is indeed not significantly different from one.
Policy discussion
Since labor income is the most important component of household income, in order to
increase household income, one naturally thinks of measures to increase labor income.
However, there is very limited scope for policies to make a significant difference here.
The most important source we found of the decline in the labor income share is the
structural transformation from agriculture to industry and services. This is a necessary
transformation for economic development. One certainly should not interfere with this
process for the sake of increasing the labor income share. If anything, urbanization is
one of the most important sources of productivity gain and it should be actively
promoted.
The second most important factor behind the decline in the labor income share is
the reform of state-owned enterprises. This has been another of the important sources
of efficiency improvement and should be continued.
It is the third reason of the decline of the labor income share that should be the tar-
get of change. In addition to its effect on the labor income share, the increase in mon-
opoly power damages not only efficiency but also fairness. However, the effect of
reducing monopoly power on the labor income share is limited because monopoly
power only explains about 10 % of the change in the labor income share.
Another factor behind labor share is the development of the services sector. Because
the labor income share in the services sector is higher than that in industry, its average
value will rise if there is a structural transformation from industry to services. The re-
cent government experiment of replacing the business tax which is levied on sales rev-
enue with the value added tax in the services sector should be a significant boost to the
services sector. Reducing the biases against the services sector in terms of land alloca-
tion and entry barriers should also have a positive effect. However, the effects of these
measures on labor income are most likely to be slow.
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It is often proposed that the minimum wage should be raised in order to increase
labor income. This measure has two opposing effects on labor income; it raises the
wages of those who are employed but reduces employment growth. Our study based
on firm level data in the manufacturing sector finds that these two effects almost
exactly offset each other. Therefore, raising minimum wages does not increase labor
income, but it reduces employment creation and economic growth.
Some of the rural policies have the effect of increasing rural income and reducing the
incentive for rural to urban migration. It is hoped that such measures will push up
urban wages and therefore increase labor income. However, these policies do not in-
crease urban labor income even if they raise urban wages, because they reduce urban
employment creation as we discussed earlier. They also reduce labor market efficiency
by hindering the productivity gain from urbanization. It is possible to increase the
household income of rural population without distorting the migration decision, if we
allow migrant workers continue to receive benefits that are equivalent to the transfers
embedded in the rural policies. Providing better education to the children of migrant
workers is one example of such a benefit that has lasting effects on economic develop-
ment and equity.
Since not much can be done to increase the labor income share, one needs to think
about other channels to increase household disposable income. One such channel is
household capital income. Among the most important household income-generating
assets are bank deposits. However, households in China are shortchanged in this source
of income because deposit interest rates are regulated by the central bank and they are
below the equilibrium deposit interest rates. One piece of evidence to support this
statement is that banks raised their deposit interest rates immediately after the central
bank allowed them to in June, 2012. If the deposit interest rates are raised further,
household capital income will increase further, both directly from bank deposits and in-
directly through the upward pressure on the return to other assets. Furthermore, inter-
est rate liberalization will play an important role in improving the efficiency of the
financial sector. The government should take resolute measures to speed up the
process of interest rate liberalization.
The government should also make it easier for households to invest in foreign assets
so that they have a larger selection of assets to invest in. One measure that can achieve
this goal is to allow foreign companies list their equity shares or issue bonds on stock
exchanges in China. The government should also encourage the development of inter-
mediaries to help Chinese households to invest in overseas securities.
Another channel to increase household disposable income is to reduce net social se-
curity payment or income tax payment. The statutory rates of social security payments
are very high. The national guideline is as follows. For pension, employer payment is
20 % of basic salary and the employee’s is 8 %. For medical insurance, employer pay-
ment is 6 % of basic salary and the employee’s is 2 %. There are also unemployment in-
surance, injury insurance, and maternity insurance. All together, the total payment rate
is about 40 % of the basic salary. This rate is the 13th highest in the world.
The social security payment is subject to a ceiling and a floor. If the basic salary is
above three times of the regional average salary, the part above is not subject to social
security levy. However, if the basic salary is below 60 % of the regional average, the pay-
ment is computed as if the basic salary was 60 % of the regional average. These features
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imply that not only is social security payment a heavy burden on employees and their
employers but also a regressive levy among people who participate in the program. The
very high payment rates also discourage participation in the program. There is a strong
case for reducing the payment rate.
If the social security benefits are cut by the same amount as the reduction of the pay-
ment, then household disposable income is not increased and it only redistributes in-
come between the workers and the retired. To increase household disposable income,
the government needs to find other sources of income for the social security program
so that it can cut the payment rate without reducing the benefits. To prevent the social
security program to become an unsustainable burden on public finance, the sources of
income for the program should have limited scope. One good candidate is the dividend
payment by state-owned enterprises. Currently, their dividend payments are mostly
reinvested in the state sector. Because such investment is not subject to sufficient over-
sight, it is a source of the overinvestment problem we discussed earlier. If state-owned
enterprises indeed need funds for worthy investment, they can always raise them from
financial institutions or the capital markets, or in the case where the investment is not
commercially profitable but is of public interest, they can ask the government for fund-
ing. Raising investment funds externally helps improve the governance of the enter-
prises. Furthermore, when there is much resentment against state-owned enterprises
among the population, using their dividend payment to support the social security pro-
gram can win popular support that is necessary for carrying out important reforms to
the program, such as postponing the retirement age.
Compared to reducing social security payment rate, cutting individual income tax
does not offer as many benefits. One reason is that cutting individual income tax does
not help the large portion of the population who do not pay individual income tax any-
way because their income is below the exemption threshold, while cutting social secur-
ity payment rate helps low-income participants proportionately more.
Conclusions
China’s investment rate has been increasing very fast since the beginning of the new
century, and it is also very high compared to that in other major economies. This paper
reports an estimate of the rate of return to capital and finds that it shows a steady trend
of decline since the early 1990s. In 2010, the average after tax and after depreciation
real rate of return was as low as 5.1 %. The paper argues that the investment rate is too
high not only because of the low return but also because it is higher than the level that
theoretically maximizes consumption. It is also argued that the investment rate is
strongly tied to the savings rate.
By analyzing the flow of funds table and the GDP account data, this paper argues that
the main reasons behind the rapidly increasing savings rate are the drastic change in
the distribution of income among households, corporations, and the government, and
the consequent increase in government savings rate. Further analysis indicates there
are many reasons for the drastic decline in the share of household disposable income
in GDP, with the drop in the labor income share as the most important one. The paper
then reports that the structural transformation from agriculture to industry and ser-
vices is the most important reason behind the decline in the labor income share. The
analysis of firm level data in the manufacturing sector shows the reform of state-owned
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enterprises and the increase in monopoly power are two other reasons for the decline
in the labor income share, with the former much more important than the latter.
The paper finally discusses policy implication of the findings. It argues that there is
limited scope for policies to affect the labor income share. It proposes that reforms in
the financial sector and the social security sector can play positive roles in increasing
household disposable income and household consumption.
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